‘Dragon-Bear’: How China and Russia’s spy operations overlap in Europe

China and Russia’s “no limits” friendship is getting a trial run in Europe.

Beijing and Moscow’s spy operations, including the recruitment of agents, are increasingly overlapping within the European Union, a senior European intelligence official told POLITICO, as security analysts point to growing attempts by Beijing to influence EU affairs. 

The two powers, which have pledged a far-reaching partnership, but aren’t formally allies, share similar aims of undermining the West, weakening support for Ukraine and dividing liberal democracies, said the official, Michal Koudelka, head of the Czech Republic’s domestic intelligence agency.

“It is not a coincidence that the same entities might serve the interests of both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China,” said Koudelka in written responses to questions from POLITICO.

There was evidence that the two nations were looking to recruit agents from the same pool of fringe anti-Western politicians in Europe, added Koudelka — though formal collaboration between their intelligence agencies remains limited.

“However, the reason behind this is not collaboration and coordination of intelligence services of these countries, but simply the fact that they are both antagonistic to the ‘collective West’ of today,” he said. 

POLITICO did not receive any response to requests for comment from the embassies of China or Russia in Belgium.

Koudelka’s comments mark the first time a top European intelligence official has spoken publicly about Chinese and Russian spy operations in Europe since his agency uncovered a major Russian influence campaign in March.

Revealed jointly by the Czech Republic’s intelligence agency and the Belgian prime minister, the operation targeted members of the European Parliament who were invited to participate in a TV show called “Voice of Europe” — which was later revealed to be bankrolled by pro-Kremlin operatives. Several participants on Voice of Europe programs were subsequently reported to be receiving payments from Chinese interests.

This “overlap” is the hidden underbelly of a warming relationship between Moscow and Beijing, security analysts said.

Indeed, President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, have been playing up their relationship ever since the two countries announced a “no limits” friendship shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

A year later, Xi told Putin that, together, their countries would bring changes to the world “not seen in 100 years.”

“Both countries know that they cannot defeat EU or NATO countries economically or by force, so they are trying their best to disrupt their unity, cohesion and readiness by any means available,” Koudelka said.

Security analysts said that Chinese and Russian state-backed media outlets were now echoing and amplifying one another’s speaking points, a form of indirect collaboration.

“The risk of [Chinese] intelligence influencing European politics through Russia-cultivated networks that have penetrated the EU’s extreme political parties on the far right and the far left is continuously rising,” Gunnar Wiegand, a former top Asia official at the EU’s diplomatic service, told POLITICO. 

“This could also be observed recently in the context of the European Parliament elections,” he added.

So far, European leaders have been more cautious about pointing fingers at Beijing than their U.S. counterparts. Asked whether China was providing help to Moscow for its war against Ukraine, top EU diplomat Josep Borrell said in June he’d seen no evidence that China was supplying weapons to Russia. 

But this seems to have emboldened China’s spymasters who were looking for profiles of politicians having already voiced support for foreign powers, namely Russia.

A recent example of how this cross-recruitment might work is Frank Creyelman, a Flemish nationalist politician.

Creyelman was excluded from his Vlaams Belaang party following a bombshell 2023 media report asserting that he accepted payments from a Chinese spy in exchange for carrying out various tasks helpful to Beijing. Creyelman had previously been known for pro-Russian positions, having traveled to Moscow and publicly opposing Western aid for Ukraine.

Creyelman did not respond to several attempts to reach him for comment.

Another case: Filip Dewinter, a leading member of the same party. Dewinter carried out election observation missions for Russia before he was sought out by a Chinese spymaster posing as a think tanker, according to an investigation by Belgian media. 

The Belgian report alleged that Dewinter had accepted payments from shell companies and think tanks backed by the Chinese Communist party, including the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) — an organization that is a front for Chinese intelligence.

Dewinter forcefully denies allegations that he knowingly acted as an intelligence asset for China.

An investigation by the ethics committee of the Flemish parliament found no grounds to sanction him. Contacted by POLITICO, Dewinter denied knowingly working for the Chinese state or its intelligence agencies. He wrote that he had not been in contact with CAIFC in Belgium, and that his only contacts in Belgium were with the European Cultural and Educational Foundation. 

(POLITICO was not able to verify the existence of this foundation. Dewinter has been linked to a similar-sounding one: the Netherlands-based China Europe Foundation of Culture and Education, whose website describes its mission as being to “strengthen the connection between China and Europe especially on cultural and educational aspects.”)

He remains a leading member of Vlaams Belang, while Creyelman was ousted following the media report about his links to China.

“It is a necessity to pay increased attention to such cooperation — notably in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, but also more generally, when doubts about our democracies are spread,” added Wiegand, who recently co-authored a report on China-Russia alignment in his capacity as a visiting distinguished fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. think tank. 

A rich talent pool

China is looking to further exploit Russia’s extensive spy network in Europe to advance its own goals, namely splitting EU countries and weakening their relationship with Washington, according to security experts.

“These are basically people who for a long time have been coopted by the Russians and then, of late, the Chinese step in,” said Filip Jirous, an independent analyst focusing on China. “This may be because they viewed these people as being susceptible to whatever promises they were able to make.”

“Ideology is definitely a factor, more so than money,” he added.

Earlier this year German police arrested the parliamentary assistant of far-right German EU lawmaker Maximilian Krah on suspicion that he was spying for China. The arrest came days after Krah was named as a key participant in the Voice of Europe network.

“As [China]  and Russia continue to align, individual cooptees will more likely work for both authoritarian states,” Jirous wrote in an article for the Jamestown Foundation.

An added bonus: If these politicians have put “skin in the game” by personally participating in a mission to serve Moscow’s interests, such as joining an election observation mission in a contested territory, like Russia-occupied parts of Ukraine, or inside Russia itself.

Dozens of far-right and far-left politicians from multiple EU countries have already joined in such missions, creating a rich pool of potential recruits. (A quick look through this searchable database turned up serving members of Alternative for Germany, France’s National Rally and Vlaams Belang, among others.) Spokespeople for these parties did not immediately reply to requests for comment.

That may well be how Frank Creyelman got on the radar of a Chinese spy working to build a network of agents in Europe.

According to reporting by Le Monde, Spiegel and the Financial Times, Creyelman spent years taking payments from a spymaster known as “Daniel Woo,” who ran a Europe-based network of assets. In one text message obtained by the outlets, Woo spelled out that “our main objective is to divide the Europe / United States relationship.”

Thanks to his work recruiting Creyelman and other European politicians, Woo was able to “successfully influence debates in the German Bundestag and … disseminate propaganda,” Le Monde wrote.

Woo’s European network was dismantled in December of last year.

But Jirous warned that Woo was unlikely to be the last Chinese handler to try to reel in European lawmakers, parliamentary staffers or ex-legislators.

“Concrete action against this can only be taken at national level, since (counter-) intelligence operations are at the heart of national competences. But with an EU-wide dimension, the EU can promote increased awareness among national intelligence services and it does tackle foreign information manipulation operations,” Wiegand added. 

Stuart Lau contributed to this report.